潜射鱼雷作战能力综合评价模型

针对潜艇作战需要 ,总结出潜射鱼雷作战能力的评价体系并对评价指标进行规范化处理。在此基础上 ,运用改进的层次分析法确定潜射鱼雷作战能力评价指标权值 ,并根据灰色关联分析理论 ,以评价潜射鱼雷作战能力指标向量的灰色关联度作为评价准则 ,建立了潜射鱼雷作战能力的综合评价模型 ,最后通过算例验证了模型的正确性、实用性。     

Applying Lanchester's linear law to model the Ardennes campaign

In modern warfare, many believe the decisive factor in winning a battle is seizing the right moment to shift from defense to attack, or vice versa. This paper attempts to bring that perspective to Lanchester's differential equations of warfare, and continues the application of Lanchester's linear law to the analysis of the World War II battle of Ardennes, as reported in earlier issues of Naval Research Logistics by Bracken and by Fricker. A new variable, shift time, accounting for the timing of the shift between defense and attack is explicitly included in our version of the model, and it helps obtain improved goodness of fit to historical data. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48:653–661, 2001     

军事应用网格MAGrid本体研究

本体论提供了对研究领域进行概念化描述的基本理论和方法.为了适应网络中心战的发展需求,提出了一种新的军事应用网格构想--MAGrid,并着重从本体论的角度对其进行研究和设计.在介绍本体论相关知识的基础上,提出了相应的层次化本体结构,并对MAGrid的两类主要本体--网格服务本体和网格应用本体进行了描述.通过该研究,为新时期军事应用系统的开发提供了新的思路和方法,对于提高军事系统整体效能具有一定的理论参考和应用价值.     

光电系统作为武器装备的应用及发展趋势

描述了现阶段光电系统在军事方面的分类及应用,简单介绍光电系统作为武器装备的优缺点及在现代化战争中的地位和作用,展望了光电系统在军事方面的发展趋势,提出了关于光电系统发展的几点愿望。     

网络中心战中的战场感知能力量化模型研究*

为了定量评价和探索提高网络中心战中的战场感知能力的途径,针对网络中心战的特点,运用集合论、信息论、图论等理论研究了战场感知能力的量化问题.首先分析了影响战场感知能力的主要因素及其作用,然后对主要因素进行了量化建模,提出了传感器对指控节点的信息量贡献模型以及指控节点之间的信息量贡献模型,建立了指控网战场感知能力量化计算模型,最后通过仿真,验证了模型的有效性,说明了提高指控网战场感知能力的有效途径.     

‘Ser Eleno’: Insurgent identity formation in the ELN

In conflict studies, identity has been posited as an explanatory factor of the resilience of insurgencies. This article focuses on the identity formation of the National Liberation Army (ELN), a leftist insurgency group in Colombia. As a Marxist–Leninist organisation, the ELN aims to overcome capitalism. In their perception, this is possible via the transformation of the individual into a ‘collective personality’. Along the dimensions of ‘content’ and ‘contestation’, we will demonstrate the mechanisms they impose for such identity formation. Identity, as we will argue, is a main factor in explaining why people participate in this insurgency and thereby enhance its resilience.     

Explaining US and British performance in complex expeditionary operations: The civil-military dimension

A nation's structure and culture of civil-military relations are important and largely overlooked factors in explaining the performance of armed forces involved in complex expeditionary operations. The US model of ‘Huntingtonian’, divided civil-military structures and poor interagency cooperation, makes the US military less suited for complex expeditionary operations. British civil-military relations involve a Defence Ministry that conscientiously integrates military and civilian personnel, as well as extensive interagency cooperation and coordination. This ‘Janowitzean’, integrated form of civil-military relations makes the British military more likely to provide for the planning and implementation of comprehensive campaigns that employ and coordinate all instruments of power available to the state, as well as troops in the field displaying the flexibility and cultural and political understanding that are necessary in complex expeditionary operations.     

The road not taken: Conflict termination and guerrillaism in the American Civil War

Irrespective our views on the rationality of our opponent's continuing to conduct operations against us, unless utterly extirpated, he retains a vote on when and how conflict will end. This is because war is about power — compelling another actor to do something he would not otherwise do, or to cease doing something he would otherwise prefer to do. In planning for conflict termination we should account for the peculiarities of opponents who may decide not to quit when we have beat them fair and square. We do not desire that they cease conventional fighting, but that they cease fighting altogether.     

A reply to Larry cable

Recent counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the local operating environment often is dominated by indigenous power-holders. As counterinsurgents seek to establish control over the local population, collaboration with these agents has become an essential aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency. Although the practice of constructing collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders might be perceived as unconventional by today's counterinsurgents, the approach itself goes back to the colonial era in which modern counterinsurgency has its roots. This article explores the dynamics, benefits, and dangers of collaborative relationships with indigenous power-holders by analysing an infamous episode in Dutch colonial history, the case of the collaboration between Dutch colonial authorities and warlord Teuku Uma during the Aceh War (1873–1913). This relationship ended in disaster for the Dutch as Uma departed their side at the moment he had become their pivotal asset in the local political landscape. The article explains that the Dutch succeeded to co-opt Uma, but failed to control him as they lacked the will and means to do so. Furthermore this case study provides an insight in the way the Dutch colonial authorities dealt with the complex process of intelligence-gathering in a fragmented indigenous society.